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A Constitution Without Constitutionalism:
Reflections on Iraq's Failed Constitutional Process
Feisal Amin Rasoul al-Istrabadi*
I. Introduction
Theoretical physicists hypothesize a "sum over histories," a concept
having its roots in the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the Schrrdinger
equation postulated in quantum mechanics.' The idea is that there are uni-
verses parallel to the one we inhabit where, for example, the French
Revolution did not occur and the Bourbon kings continue to rule to this day
in an unbroken chain.2 Moreover, there is an infinite number of parallel uni-
verses whereby the infinite chains of possible permutations relating to French
history since July 14, 1789 (and, for that matter, before) have played them-
selves out.3  In this multiverse of infinite possibilities, the 2003 military
intervention by the United States in Iraq was accomplished competently. A
constitutional process unfolded a decade or so later; one in which Iraqis of all
political and ethnoconfessional persuasions participated. Wise leadership
prevailed, and compromises were struck that caused the efflorescence of na-
tional cohesion and harmony. The result has been a peaceful and fecund
Iraq.
Regrettably, in our universe, virtually everything that could go wrong
did so. Far from engendering national cohesion, the constitutional process
* Visiting Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington;
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations. B.A. (Chem.), J.D. (Indiana University-Bloomington); LL.M., S.J.D.
(Northwestern University School of Law). Ambassador al-Istrabadi, who is currently on leave from
his post at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the principal legal drafter of Iraq's interim
constitution in 2003 to 2004. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily
represent those of the Government of Iraq. An early version of this Article was given as a talk to
the faculty of the Maurer School on April 5, 2007. The author is grateful to Professor David C.
Williams for many kindnesses, one of which is allowing the title of this Article to play off the title
of his own, which came first. David C. Williams, Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma's
Struggle to Build a New Order, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 1657 (2009).
1. See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, BLACK HOLES AND BABY UNIVERSES AND OTHER ESSAYS 78-
79 (1993) (discussing the creation of the "concept of a sum over histories" to solve the "problems
with quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle" that troubled Einstein). The hypothesis was
first elucidated by the late Nobel laureate in physics, Richard Feynman. ld at 79.
2. See, e.g., MICHIO KAKU, PARALLEL WORLDS: A JOURNEY THROUGH CREATION, HIGHER
DIMENSIONS, AND THE FUTURE OF THE COSMOS 168 (2005) ("[A]t each quantum juncture, the
universe splits in half, in a never-ending sequence of splitting universes. All universes are possible
in this scenario, each as real as the other.").
3. Physicist Frank Wilczek also describes this principle by discussing many worlds in which
Helen of Troy "was not a captivating beauty" and instead had "an ugly wart on her nose." Id. at 169
(quoting Frank Wilczek). In each of these universes, presumably Paris would not have abducted
Helen and the Trojan War would not have occurred. Id.
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very nearly ripped the country apart and threatens still to do so. The process
was initially boycotted by Iraq's second largest ethnoconfessional group,
SunnT-Arabs.4 Some of their supposed representatives, recruited by the U.S.
Embassy, participated as unelected members of the Constitutional Drafting
Committee.5 When an impasse occurred, the elected representatives of the
two other major ethnoconfessional groups, Shici Arabs and Kurds, excluded
them from the process. 6 Those articulating a vision for the most radical re-
structuring of the country controlled the process, and they were in no mood
for compromise. The result was the ignition almost immediately of a brutal,
and in Iraq, unprecedented wave of ethnoconfessional violence that has left
tens of thousands of civilians dead and up to 5 million externally and inter-
nally displaced persons. Why did the constitutional process fail so miserably
after what was a collective sigh of relief that Iraq's brutal dictator had been
removed from office?
This Article argues that there are two principal reasons for the failure of
the Iraqi Constitution of 20067 and the process surrounding it to engender
national cohesion. First, the process of constitution drafting in Iraq was an
insufficiently organic one. Rather, its terms of reference were too often
dictated, or so it seemed, by U.S. interests, such as narrow partisan and
electoral issues in Washington. Second, and equally important, the new po-
litical elites did not trust each other and had not arrived at a sufficiently
common vision for what the new constitutional order should be. Because of
factors exogenous to the constitutional process itself, those with a (probably
minority) view favoring a radical reordering of the state were able to impose
their vision on the draft text. The result has been constitutional tension that
erupted into ethnoconfessional violence and that threatens further instability.
4. See BOB WOODWARD, STATE OF DENIAL: BUSH AT WAR, PART III 383 (2006) ("But the
minority Sunnts had effectively boycotted the election, leaving 20 percent of the population out-an
important, critical segment .... "). It is also possible that the Sunnis stayed away not entirely as a
result of a political boycott of the elections but at least in part due to the high level of violence in
areas in which they predominated. See id. at 375 (describing President Bush pushing for ways for
Sunnis to participate despite the violence in their region).
5. See ALl A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE
405-06 (2007) (describing the process leading to the inclusion of unelected Sunnis in the
Constitutional Drafting Committee).
6. See id. at 412-17 (discussing the isolation of the Sunni negotiators and their ultimate
rejection of the draft put forward for the referendum).
7. Many commentators refer to the permanent Constitution of Iraq as the "2005 Constitution."
See, e.g., JONATHAN MORROW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, WEAK VIABILITY: THE IRAQI FEDERAL
STATE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS 1 (2006), http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/srl68.pdf (discussing the "2005 Iraqi constitution" and its failure to reconcile
"competing visions of the Iraqi state"); REIDAR VISSER, DEBATING DEVOLUTION IN IRAQ (2008),
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero03l008.html (comparing the "gradual 'bottom-up' federalism"
provided for in the "2005 Iraqi constitution" with the federalist structure that was ultimately
implemented in 2008). This author retains the Iraqi usage of dating Iraqi constitutional documents
from the year of their coming into force, in this case 2006.
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Ultimately, this Article concludes that early constitutional drafting in
the case of Iraq was devastating. Instead, a modus vivendi should have been
attempted, one which preserved the status quo. This would have allowed the
political elites to engage in confidence-building measures, develop trust in
one another, and develop a compromised, but shared, vision of the future for
the state. Instead, before this process could be nurtured, the parties were
forced into a negotiation "for all the marbles" in a zero-sum environment.
The result has been disastrous, in no small part because positions in the post-
constitutional period have hardened, as compromise now would result in
more than one party losing face with its constituents.
The analysis in this Article is divided into three parts. Part II describes
briefly the deeply divisive question of federalism as it occurred in the con-
stitutional negotiations in post-2003 Iraq. This Article focuses on that issue,
because it is singularly the most contentious one faced by the new political
elites and because it was central to the constitutional deliberations. Part II,
drawing to a significant extent on this author's personal experiences,
particularly in respect to the interim Constitution of 2004, is a reflection on
the American role in the constitution-drafting process. Part IV is a
preliminary, and perhaps inchoate, reflection on the divisive role that the new
political elites played in the constitutional processes. It, too, is informed by
the author's personal acquaintance with, and knowledge of, many of the
principal players and events involved.
One ought to approach Iraq with caution. Given the history of blunders
there over the past six years, it is possible to claim any number of often
contradictory "lessons learned" and to adduce evidence selectively in support
of virtually any proposition. One of the interlocutors at the conference that
gave rise to this Article proclaimed "the end of Iraq" three years ago. 8 Yet
rumors of my country's demise-like Mark Twain's death-may have been
greatly exaggerated. Still, while caution is warranted-along perhaps with
no small dose of humility-surely some conclusions can be stated about why
the constitutional process in Iraq has failed to act as a catalyst of national
unity.
II. A Brief Synopsis of the Federalism Divide
In Iraq the most emotionally charged issue, bar none-as charged as
was the slavery debate in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries-was the nature of federalism and the extent of the powers of the
newly-created federal government in Baghdad. Historically, Iraq was a
8. See generally PETER GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: How AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE
CREATED A WAR WITHOUT END 207 (2006) (describing the Iraqi Constitution as creating a three-
state "solution," one that might "lead to the country's dissolution"). It seems to the author that
Galbraith adopts a hypernationalist Kurdish viewpoint, and thus utterly and erroneously discounts
the existence of an Iraqi nationalism and identity amongst Iraq's Arab majority at the very least.
16292009]
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unitary state.9  So, for instance, the central government in Baghdad
distributed the assets derived from the sale of oil. 0 There were no meaning-
ful checks and balances on decisions taken by Baghdad, as an example, on
which parts of the country would receive funds for development and which
regions would be ignored." Thus, the constitutional innovations made post-
2003 aimed to make a federated state out of a unitary one, something
unprecedented, at least in the Middle East.12 Given the importance of this
topic, it is appropriate to set forth briefly the broad parameters of the issue
before proceeding further.
The Iraqi Kurdish leadership was the principal driving force in the
federalism debate. The Kurds had been promised autonomy by Iraq's
BaCthist Provisional Constitution thirty years earlier,13 and although that
promise had not been kept at the time, they had achieved much more than
autonomy in 1991 in the wake of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait: they
had achieved de facto independence.14 No one wanted to turn the clock back
and reassert centralized control over Iraqi Kurdistan, a suggestion that would
have been totally unacceptable to the Kurdish leadership and to the rank-and-
file in the region.' 5 The post-2003 constitutions thus expressly recognized
9. See LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE
BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 163 (2005) ("Iraq had always been highly
centralized," and "for many Iraqis, the unitary state was a bedrock principle of their nationalist
identity.").
10. ABBAS ALNASRAWI, IRAQ'S BURDENS: OIL, SANCTIONS, AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 161-
63 (2002).
11. See id at 163 (discussing the unchecked power of Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary
Command Counsel to distribute funds).
12. See DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 163 (discussing "the introduction of federalism into a
historically unitary state" and explaining that "[m]any in Iraq and the Arab world did not understand
what federalism meant"). By contrast, the United Arab Emirates, similar to the experience in the
United States, made in 1971 a federal state out of seven British Crown colonies, the Trucial States.
ALl MOHAMMED KHALIFA, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: UNITY IN FRAGMENTATION 27-30
(1979); Butti Sultan al-Muhairi, United Arab Emirates, in 4 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 1690
(Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002).
13. See IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY I (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 4th ed. 1990) ("A March 1974
amendment to the Constitution provides for autonomy for the Kurds in the region where they
constitute a majority of the population."); PHEBE MARR, THE MODERN HISTORY OF IRAQ 142 (2d
ed. 2003) (stating that the Provisional Constitution of 1970 created a state "formed of two
nationalities, Arab and Kurd, with recognition of Kurdish national rights").
14. See AL-DISTOR AL-MU'AQQAT, 1970 [Constitution], art. 8(c), translated in 2 AMOS J.
PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 378 (rev. 4th ed. 1985) ("The area whose majority of
population is from Kurds, shall enjoy autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the law.");
IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 177 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 4th ed. 1990) ("The Baathist government in
1970 granted the Kurdish minority a degree of autonomy .. "); Phebe Marr, Kurds and Arabs,
Sunnis and Shiites: Can an Iraqi Identity Be Salvaged?, in RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN IRAQ:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 63, 66-68 (David Little & Donald K. Swearer eds., 2006)
(discussing the extent of separation between Kurdistan and the rest of the country over the
preceding fifteen years).
15. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE KURDS IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ 3
(2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf (describing Kurdish autonomy in the post-
Saddam period and the Kurdish aversion to losing it).
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the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as the federated region with
jurisdiction over the three governorates that constitute Iraqi Kurdistan.' 6
Thus, the Kurdish leadership was effectively offering the reintegration of
Iraqi Kurdistan into the rest of the country on the condition that a federal ar-
rangement would be enshrined in the new Constitution.' 7
Creating a newly federated structure involved, of course, a number of
highly contentious questions. Amongst these questions was whether the part
of the country that was predominately Arab and represented some 80% of the
population'8 would be subject to a federated arrangement. In other words,
would the rest of the country be a part of a symmetrical federation, or would
Iraq be organized asymmetrically, with the Arab-majority areas ruled directly
by Baghdad? The Kurdish leadership, for its part, promoted a symmetrical
federation, evidently motivated by a desire to avoid a seemingly anomalous
constitutional arrangement between Baghdad and Kurdistan. But even if that
were acceptable to the rest of the country, there was still an issue of what
precisely symmetrical federation meant. It could, for instance, be based on
creating a federal arrangement with each of Iraq's remaining fifteen
governorates, allowing (or more accurately, encouraging) the different
governorates to combine into larger regional governorates, or employing
some permutation thereof.
For the Arabs of Iraq, however, the situation was quite different.
Opinion polls conducted after the referendum approving the regionalist
Constitution showed the overwhelming majority of Iraq's population did not
wish to live in a federated arrangement with Baghdad. 19 Even after much of
the ethnosectarian violence, nearly six in ten Iraqis favored a unitary state
over federation or partition.20  That point was made emphatically in early
2009, when an attempt to create a federated region out of the oil-rich
Governorate of Basra, whose population is overwhelmingly Arab Shicah,
16. DISTOR JAMHURIYYAT AL-CIRAQ [DISTOR] [Constitution] art. 113, translated in 9
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Rildiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2009);
QANDN IDARAT AL-DAULAH AL-ClRAQIYYAH LIL MARHALAH AL-INTIQALIYYAH [TAL]
[Constitution], art. 53, para. A, translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra.
17. See KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing the Kurdish method of retaining federal
leverage by having the authority to alter certain laws and strike down a permanent constitution with
veto power if it did not provide for them).
18. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: IRAQ (2009), https://www.cia.gov
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html#People. It should be noted that the last
reliable census done in Iraq was in 1957, and that census neither asked for the respondent's national
origin (Arab or Kurd) nor sectarian affiliation. The author perused the 1957 census during the
drafting of the TAL.
19. ABC NEWS/USA TODAY/BBC/ARD POLL, EBBING HOPE IN A LANDSCAPE OF LOSS
MARKS A NATIONAL SURVEY OF IRAQ 8 (2007), http://abcnews.go.com/images/US/1033alraqpoll.
pdf.
20. Id.
2009] 1631
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failed miserably.21 It was unable to obtain the signatures of 10% of
registered voters even to get the matter on the ballot for referendum.22
Only one non-Kurdish party pressed for the radical vision of federalism
or regionalism. It was the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI), since renamed the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC).
23
This party was formed in exile in Iran during the eight years of the Iraq-Iran
War, and it had fought alongside Iran against Iraq during that war.24  It
shared, along with its Iranian allies, a vision of a state in which the Shicah
clergy ruled.25 It also shared, in common with the Kurdish leadership, a vi-
sion of a hyperfederation in which Iraq would largely be divided into
ethnosectarian regions, with the Kurds controlling northern Iraq, Sunni Arabs
controlling the country's center, and the Shicah controlling the south.26 The
chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee in 2005 was a member of
SCIRI/SIIC.27
It would be a mistake to assume, however, that all of Iraq's Kurds favor
hyperfederalism or regionalism. While no direct evidence exists about the
views of Baghdadi Kurds, there is very strong circumstantial evidence sug-
gesting that they reject the regionalist agenda of the two principal Kurdish
nationalist parties. These two parties ran as a coalition in the December 2005
elections held under the permanent Constitution, and they fielded a list in
Baghdad.28 The list was headed by a particularly distinguished gentleman,
Hoshyar Zibari, who was then, and is now, Iraq's Minister for Foreign
Affairs. 29 Baghdad, still the largest Kurdish city in the country, is home to
some 1 million Kurds, and only about 44,000 votes were needed to elect a
member from the Kurdish Alliance to the new parliament. 30  Yet not one
single member was elected to parliament from this list in Baghdad (though
some were seated due to the rounding that occurs in Iraq's proportional
21. Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State, Part II: Wail Abd al-Latif Concedes Defeat,
HISTORIAE.ORG, Jan. 17, 2009, http://historiae.org/latif.asp.
22. Id.
23. See id. (discussing the Council's plans to create a nine-govemorate federal region extending
all the way from Basra to Baghdad).
24. GlobalSecurity.org, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, http://www.global
security.org/military/world/para/sciri.htm.
25. See id. ("SCIRI was directly supported with funds by Tehran and with arms by Iran's elite
Revolutionary Guard.").
26. Jeff Weintraub, Thinking Seriously About "Centralism" and "Federalism" in Iraq,
SILOBREAKER, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.silobreaker.com/DocumentReader.aspx?ltem=
5_2262151836490268672.
27. ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 404.
28. Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraq: Political Parties (Re)Align For December Elections, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/Content/Article/1062557.html.
29. KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 3.
30. INT'L MISSION FOR IRAQI ELECTIONS, FINAL REPORT ON THE DECEMBER 15, 2005, IRAQI
COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS 30 (2006), http://www.ihec.iq/content/file/other-reports
/imie final report_2005_cor electionsen.pdf.
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representation system).31 It seems quite plausible to interpret this result as a
rejection of the driving agenda of the Kurdish parties.
Notwithstanding the seeming ambivalence of most Iraqis, the 2006
Constitution adopted an extreme version of federalism. For instance, it al-
lowed one or more of Iraq's governorates to form a federated region,32
stipulating that local laws have "priority" over federal laws.33  The
Constitution also substantially weakened the powers of the federal
government, to the extent that some observers argued that the federal gov-
ernment could not impose taxes.34 It also permitted federated regions to
create their own security forces35 and created ambiguity respecting the man-
agement of newly discovered oil fields.36 The new Constitution was widely
seen by Iraqi nationalists as a de facto partition of the country.37  Not
surprisingly, violence ensued almost immediately upon ratification of the
document.
38
III. An American Process for an Iraqi Constitution
It does not appear that the United States, acting through the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), had a clear idea of how the constitutional
process should unfold in Iraq when it first intervened in 2003. Of course, the
original "plan" was for the United States to turn over sovereignty to an Iraqi
government very quickly. 39 That plan was discarded almost immediately,
and an American imperator, Paul Bremer, was appointed instead.40 His vi-
sion of a constitutional process initially was that he would appoint a group of
Iraqi advisors who would in turn appoint a constitutional committee to advise
on a way forward.41 In July 2003, Ambassador Bremer appointed a twenty-
five person Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)-"governing" in name only.42
31. ALEX KIREEV, INDEP. ELECTORAL COMM'N OF IRAQ, IRAQ: LEGISLATIVE ELECTION 2005,
http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/i/iraq/iraq-legislative-election-2005.htm.
32. DISTORart. 119.
33. Id. art. 115.
34. See, e.g., MORROW, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that Iraq's Constitution impedes the national
government's ability to tax, thereby weakening the government's power).
35. DISTORart. 121,§5.
36. Id. art. 112, § 1.
37. See DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 163 ("Iraq had always been highly centralized, and for many
Iraqis, the unitary state was a bedrock principle of their nationalist identity.").
38. See ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 418 (discussing the intensification of insurgency and terrorist
attacks aimed at undermining the public's confidence in the new government).
39. DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 32.
40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 47.
42. The international humanitarian law on occupation notwithstanding, the CPA believed that it
was "the lawful government of Iraq." Michael A. Newton, Legal Authorities for the Creation of the
Iraqi High Tribunal, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL 15, 20 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006); see also Brett H. McGurk,
Revisiting the Law of Nation-Building: Iraq in Transition, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 451, 460 (2005)
("[T]he CPA was to exercise full governing authority, build new institutions, reform old ones, and
2009] 1633
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The IGC, in turn, appointed two bodies, a Council of Ministers and a
Constitutional Preparatory Committee.43 In no small part to maintain the
ethnosectarian proportions of the IGC as determined by the CPA, each IGC
member insisted on a right to appoint a minister and a member of the consti-
tutional committee, with the consequence that each subsidiary body had
twenty-five members.4 The manner of these appointments evinces a basic
distrust amongst the IGC members and suggests that a reasonable compro-
mise on membership of these bodies proved impossible.
On October 16, 2003, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1511, recognizing that the U.S.-U.K. occupation authority would
continue to exercise temporary authority in Iraq until after a permanent con-
stitution came into effect and a government duly elected pursuant thereto
came to power.45 The Security Council made no mention of an interim
constitution.46 Yet exactly thirty days after having sponsored 1511, the
United States abruptly changed course.47 Bremer forced the IGC to agree to
the so-called November 15th Agreement, whereby the Iraqis would draft an
interim constitution, authority would be transferred to an interim government
by July 2004, and caucuses would be held to select a transitional
parliament.48
What could have accounted for such an instantaneous sea change in
U.S. policy? It appears that U.S. policy makers decided soon after the pas-
sage of Resolution 1511 that the Iraqis were making insufficient progress in
pushing the constitutional process forward.49 Rather than considering that
perhaps the Iraqis might need more time to come to a meaningful consensus
on the constitution, the Americans concluded that the Iraqis needed to be hur-
ried along, hence the November 15th Agreement. It would not be the last
time the United States pushed the process forward precisely when pulling
back might have been more appropriate.5 °
establish conditions for economic growth. In other words, the CPA was to do everything the
international law of occupation appeared to prohibit.").
43. See S.C. Res. 1511, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003) (welcoming the
appointment by the IGC of these two bodies).
44. See Adeed Dawisha & Larry Diamond, Iraq"s Year of Voting Dangerously, J. DEMOCRACY,
Apr. 2006, at 89, 102 n.4 (noting that the ethnosectarian balance was "replicated" in the cabinet
appointments). It should be noted that not all IGC members appointed ministers who were their co-
religionists. Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni, appointed a Shi-i to the post of Minister of Planning.
45. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 43, 1-2.
46. Id.
47. DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 51.
48. Id. at 51-52.
49. See Richard W. Stevenson, The Struggle for Iraq: Strategy; US. Aide in Iraq in Urgent
Talks at White House, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at AI (observing that Bremer's trip to the White
House was prompted by the growing sense that Bremer needed to abandon a "methodical" approach
to the election of an Iraqi government in favor of a more rapid method).
50. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
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There were a number of problems with the U.S. plan. Amongst them
was the convening of a caucus to select the transitional parliament. To begin
with, there was-and is-no Arabic word for "caucus. ' '51 Explaining what
the concept meant was cumbersome and, at times, comic. More
substantively, the Americans had in mind that the members of the caucus
would themselves be selected by having one-third of them appointed by the
IGC, one-third by provincial councils, and one-third by local councils. But
of course, it was the United States that had appointed the members of each of
these bodies; it was no small matter explaining how a "caucus," selected by
bodies that had themselves been appointed by the United States, could in turn
appoint a transitional parliament with any colorable claim of legitimacy.
Moreover, U.S. policy in Iraq had headed into a buzz saw: The Grand
Ayatullah Ali al-Sistdni, the most senior Shici cleric in Iraq. He had issued a
fatwah earlier, declaring that only an elected body could draft a
constitution.5 2  The Grand Ayatullah-though himself an Iranian national
who never acquired Iraqi citizenship-had single-handedly caused U.S.
policy to change. Whereas previous U.S. policy had been that an unelected
body would draft a permanent constitution, the November 15th Agreement
provided for an elected body to do so.53 Not that many in the occupation au-
thority seemed to consult Iraqi history, but there was also a historical
precedent for an elected body. Eighty years earlier, an elected Constituent
Assembly had ratified Iraq's first postindependence constitution, the Basic
Law of 1925. 54 It was difficult to justify why, eighty years later, a
nonelected body should undertake the task.
An interim constitution, the Law of Administration of the State of Iraq
for the Transitional Period (TAL), was promulgated by the IGC and the CPA
in March 2004.55 Iraq would be governed under its terms until a permanent
constitution could be drafted by an elected assembly and approved in a na-
tional referendum.56  This author has elsewhere described the salient
provisions of, and some of the negotiations surrounding, the TAL and will
51. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION FIASCO 180
(2005); see also HANI LUBBADEH, AL-NIBRAS ENGLISH-ARABIC DICTIONARY 152 (1993) (using
phrases, not any single word, to translate "caucus" into Arabic).
52. See Noah Feldman, The Democratic Fatwa: Islam and Democracy in the Realm of
Constitutional Politics, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2005) (quoting, in full, the fatwa that al-SistdnT
issued in June 2003 and expounding on the political impact of this democratic legal argument).
53. See Agreement on Political Process, AL-BAB, Nov. 15, 2003, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/
docs/iraq/cpa03a.htm (announcing that Iraq's permanent constitution would be drafted by a body
directly elected by the Iraqi people).
54. PHILIP W. IRELAND, IRAQ: A STUDY N POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 393 (1938); see also
Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq: Key Provisions of the Transitional
Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269, 269 & n.l (2005-2006) (observing that Iraq's
only legitimate, permanent constitution was ratified by an elected body).
55. TAL, pmbl.
56. Id.
2009] 1635
Texas Law Review
not do so again here.57 It suffices for purposes of this discussion to recall that
the TAL successfully disposed (albeit on a provisional basis) of four issues,
at least two of which still prove contentious.
First, the TAL preserved the status quo with respect to Kurdish
autonomy in northern Iraq.58 It recognized that the areas above the Green
Line, which had been a de facto part of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) as of the commencement of hostilities in 2003, would continue to be
governed by the KRG, though the eighteen-governorate structure of Iraq
(including the three governorates that principally formed the KRG) would
also be preserved. 59 Second, the TAL recognized the federal nature of the
relationship between the KRG and the government in Baghdad. It thus gave
de jure recognition to the KRG for the first time in an Iraqi constitutional
text.
60
Third, and far more contentious, was the issue of control over Iraq's
natural resources. Yet this issue, too, was resolved, again on the basis of pre-
serving the status quo and without prejudice to future negotiations. The
government in Baghdad would continue to oversee the development and ex-
traction of Iraq's natural resources, the principal one obviously being oil.
61
Revenues, however, would be distributed to regions and governorates, taking
into account, inter alia, demographic distribution (i.e., population).62 Fourth,
and equally contentious, was whether other federated regions could be
formed during the interim period. Some believed that recognizing the status
quo with respect to the Kurds was different qualitatively from affirmatively
dividing the rest of the country into federated regions prior to the coming into
effect of a permanent constitution.63 Nonetheless, a compromise was reached
on this issue as well: up to three governorates could become a federated
region, but doing so would be relatively cumbersome during the interim
period.64 Without belaboring it further, the point here is that the foundations
of a modus vivendi were laid in the TAL.
The TAL stipulated that elections would be held for a National
Assembly in January 2005.65 It must be borne in mind that the TAL was
57. AI-Istrabadi, supra note 54, at 269.
58. See TAL, art. 54, para. A ("The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform
its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall
within the exclusive competence of the federal government as specified in this Law."); see also
DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 163 (commenting that Iraqi Kurdistan has enjoyed more than a decade
of autonomy).
59. TAL, art. 53, paras. A-B; see also DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 164 (noting that the Kurds
pressed hard for all the territory north of the Green Line).
60. ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 224.
61. TAL, art. 25, para. E.
62. Id.
63. See DIAMOND, supra note 9, at 167-68 (highlighting the opinion that such a fundamental
reorganization of the Iraqi state should not occur during this transitional period).
64. TAL, art. 53, para. C.
65. Id., art. 30, para. D.
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ratified by the IGC in March 2004.66 By December of that year, the
insurgency was in full swing, and major Arab SunnT groups had announced
their intention to boycott the January elections.67 These elections would of
course elect the new parliament, but that parliament would also act as the
constituent assembly to draft the permanent Constitution.68 The SunnT boy-
cott threatened to repeat an unfortunate episode in Iraq's history: the Shici
religious authorities ordered a boycott of the elections for the Constituent
Assembly in the 1920s, which in turn led some of Iraq's Shicah to feel disen-
franchised for generations.69
As tensions rose and security deteriorated, it was widely reported that
the Iraqi Council of Ministers was nearly unanimous-with at most two or
three dissenting voices-in its view that elections should be delayed. 70 One
voice stood adamantly against delay: President George W. Bush.71 One Arab
diplomat has told this author that an Arab head of state attempting to explain
to the American President the ramifications of a Sunni boycott was inter-
rupted with the rejoinder that no delay in elections would be contemplated
and that there should be no further discussion of the issue. To delay
elections, in the President's view, would be to hand the terrorists a victory.
An elder Iraqi statesman, Dr. Adnan Pachachi, who had served as Foreign
Minister in the mid-1960s in the government overthrown by the Bacthists in
1968, and who, while serving as the IGC President, had chaired the TAL
drafting committee, wrote a rejoinder to this line of reasoning.72 In words
that appear now eerily prophetic, he wrote:
But there is more than one way for the terrorists to win in Iraq in
January. Another would be for them to cause large numbers of Iraqis
to stay away from the polls, not in protest but out of fear for their
lives. That would result in elections whose legitimacy would be
questioned. Whoever was perceived as having won such a flawed
66. Dexter Filkins, Iraq Council, with Reluctant Shiites, Signs Charter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2004, at Ai.
67. Dexter Filkins & Warren Hoge, As January Nears, Iraq Waits for Promised Election
Assistance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A10 (reporting that a cleric, speaking for thousands of
Sunni mosques, threatened a boycott if the American and Iraqi military presence continued in
Fallujah).
68. TAL, art. 60.
69. See ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 205-06 ("It was a commonplace amongst the Shi'a that by
failing to cooperate with the British mandate authorities in the 1920s, and resisting occupation on
the grounds of patriotism, they effectively handed over the governing of Iraq to the Sunni Arabs.").
70. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Editorial, How a Vote Could Derail Democracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2005, at C13 (predicting that elections would increase political polarization and violence);
Edward Wong, Big Iraqi Parties Are Urging Delay in Jan. 30 Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004,
at Al (reporting that fifteen political groups petitioned for a six-month postponement of the
elections to address security concerns and to make administrative arrangements, but SIcah Muslim
representatives were insistent that the elections be held by the end of January).
71. Bush: Iraq Vote Shouldn't Be Delayed, CNN, Dec. 3, 2004, http://edition.cnn.coml2004/
WORLD/meast/12/02/iraq.main/.
72. Adnan Pachachi, Editorial, Delay the Elections, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005, at B7.
2009) 1637
Texas Law Review
election would claim a mandate, while others would claim they had
been disenfranchised. Very few scenarios take us deeper into chaos
and civil unrest than this very likely outcome. I would argue that the
prospect of these disastrous events unfolding is far worse than any
short-lived claim of victory the terrorists might make.
73
Whether because of the boycott or-equally likely-because of the
violence that was especially gripping the predominately Sunni areas, 74 many
Sunnis stayed home during balloting.75 Although nationally the turnout was
580/o--still meaning that 42% of the electorate did not cast a vote-in many
predominately Sunni Arab areas turnout was disastrously low.7 6 In Anbar
Governorate, for instance, fewer than 2% of registered voters actually cast a
vote.7  The end result was precisely as Larry Diamond had predicted it
would be when he too had urged a delay in the elections.78 Writing three
weeks before the elections, he noted that, if the Sunnis failed to go to the
polls, they would be catastrophically underrepresented in the National
Assembly and hence in the constitutional drafting process because Iraq was
operating under a proportional representation system in which the entire
country was treated as a single district.79 The effect of low Sunni turnout
would eliminate their representation and lead to civil strife.80  Like
Pachachi's earlier, Diamond's words were prophetic, as fewer than twenty
Arab Sunnis were elected to the 275-member National Assembly. 81
The TAL had posited that the process of constitution drafting would
take some seven months and that a final draft would be proffered by mid-
August.82 Once the drafting was completed, the draft would be published
and debated publicly for two months. Only then would the document be
73. Id.
74. The predominately Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiyah in Baghdad, for instance, had no
polling stations whatsoever because the violence was so rampant. See John F. Bums, Security Is
Key Issue for Sunnis: Voters Turn Out in Upbeat Mood, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 17, 2005, at 5
(describing the neighborhood as being completely deserted of voters during the January 2005
transitional elections).
75. See ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 392 (describing the boycott of Sunnis as "near universal" but
claiming that nearly 60% of all eligible voters did vote).
76. Id.
77. PATRICK COCKBURN, THE OCCUPATION: WAR AND RESISTANCE IN IRAQ 187 (2006); see
also ANTONIA JUHASZ, THE BUSH AGENDA: INVADING THE WORLD, ONE ECONOMY AT A TIME
245 (2006) (recounting the absence of Sunni Arabs from the election).
78. Diamond, supra note 70.
79. See id. ("If turnout is much heavier in the Shifah south and Kurdish north than in Sunni
provinces... the Sunnis, who account for about 15 percent to 20 percent of the population, may
win only a tiny percentage of the seats.").
80. Id.
81. JONATHAN MORROW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS II: AN
OPPORTUNITY LOST 6 (2005), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sri55.pdf.
82. TAL, art. 61, para. A.
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submitted for a referendum in October.83  This schedule turned out to be
naively overoptimistic.
It took nearly four months for the Iraqi Transitional Government to
form, after intense negotiations between Shi i religious parties and the
Kurdish coalition. 84  Noticeably absent from these negotiations (over
government posts and other political issues not including the Constitution)
was any Sunni representation. 85 By June, the National Assembly had failed
to convene the Constitutional Drafting Committee, in particular because
there was wrangling about Sunni representation. 86 As it turned out, the entire
drafting process took about six weeks, and the final text went to referendum
without any significant input from any Arab Sunnis.87
The TAL foresaw that there might be difficulty in proffering an agreed
text on the tight schedule it had contemplated (let alone the schedule as it
actually unfolded).88 Accordingly, it contained two escape hatches. 89 The
first was where, though unable to conclude a draft within the contemplated
time frame, the National Assembly believed that it might be able to complete
the drafting if it had an additional six months.90 Under such circumstances,
the Assembly could vote itself for additional time.91 While this provision
was not exactly utilized, an appeal was made to a variation on its theme. The
chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, a member of the SCIRI,
recognized that it would be impossible to complete a text within the TAL's
strict time limits. 92  Accordingly, he publicly requested a fifteen-day
extension. 93  Yet before any member of the Iraqi political class had the
opportunity of responding, the American ambassador in Baghdad announced
83. Id, art. 61, para. B.
84. See ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 396 (chronicling the formation of the coalition and the
swearing in of the Jaafri government on May 3, 2005).
85. See THOMAS MOWLE, HOPE IS NOT A PLAN: THE WAR IN IRAQ FROM INSIDE THE GREEN
ZONE 9 (2007) ("Sunni Arabs were grievously underrepresented in the [Transitional National
Assembly]. The Shia Arabs and Kurds were free to allocate government positions as they
wished.").
86. See ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 405-06 (describing the efforts of the United States to get
Sunnis to join the government and the subsequent failure to convene the Constitutional Drafting
Committee until July 2005).
87. Id. at 414, 412-14 (describing the constitution-drafting process and noting that "the draft
constitution was finally read to the National Assembly with only three of the fifteen Arab Sunni
members present").
88. TAL, art. 61, para. F.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 413.
93. See Craig S. Smith & Dexter Filkins, US. and Iraq to Plan Military Transfer; Iraqis Push
to Meet Constitution Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at A6 ("Iraqi leaders on Monday
reaffirmed their decision to finish writing the country's constitution by the middle of the
month ....").
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that no extension would be needed.94 The possibility of extending the time
line-and perhaps reaching a compromise-was stillborn.
The second escape hatch contained in the TAL was where there was a
true impasse in the National Assembly. In that event, there would be new
elections in December 2005, the transitional period would be extended for
one more year, and the process would start all over again with the new
National Assembly. 95 This resetting of the clock would also occur in the
event the referendum rejected the proposed draft: a new Assembly would be
elected in December, and the process would begin again.96 This provision
presented a real possibility for reversing course and opening up the process
of drafting. Immediately after the January 2005 elections, the Sunnis real-
ized what a horrendous blunder they had made and regretted their lack of
participation. 97 Given the inability of the negotiators to agree to a draft text,
declaring an impasse, thereby triggering this provision, would have meant
that the Sunnis could participate in the December 2005 elections, as indeed
they did, and become full partners from within the elected National
Assembly.
Again, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad worked feverishly to ensure that
this second provision would not become operative. Initially, the U.S.
Ambassador had sponsored the inclusion into the drafting process of
individuals he believed had colorable claim to be representatives of Iraq's
Arab Sunni population.98 These were individuals brought in from outside the
National Assembly. 99  He had brokered an agreement between these
individuals and the elected members of the drafting committee that the final
text would not be submitted for referendum unless the entire committee,
including the elected and unelected members, agreed on the final text by
consensus. 100 When the unelected Sunni members balked at the text, the
elected members-with the apparent blessing of the U.S. Embassy-reneged
94. See id. (U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad "played an active part in pushing Iraqi leaders
toward their decision on Sunday to stick to an Aug[ust] 15 deadline for drafting a new constitution,
urging them to set aside any issues that could not be resolved by that date.").
95. TAL, art. 61, para. E.
96. Id.
97. See Rick Jervis, Dem Senator Predicts More Sunni Participation, USA TODAY ONLINE,
July 5, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-07-05-sunni-involvementx.htm (citing
Laith Kubba, a spokesperson for the Iraqi Prime Minister, as saying the Sunnis regretted not
participating in the January election).
98. See id (asserting that the "committee charged with drafting the constitution accepted 15
Sunni members Tuesday").
99. See ALLAWt, supra note 5, at 404-06 (noting that, in addition to fifty-five members of the
National Assembly, a group of unelected Sunnis were included in the Constitutional Drafting
Committee).
100. See id. at 405 (mentioning promises that major decisions regarding the constitution would
be by consensus, including the Sunni committee members).
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on the deal, submitting the objectionable text to referendum notwithstanding
the lack of consensus.'°' The referendum was set for October 15, 2005.
Under the TAL's rules for approval of the draft permanent Constitution,
any three governorates could veto the proposed Constitution if they rejected
it by a two-thirds vote.'0 2  It began to appear in early October that there
would be a sufficient vote to reject the TAL in the three predominately Sunni
governorates.10 3  The American Ambassador swung into action again.
Whereas the text of the proposed Constitution, which had been published and
circulated nationwide, contained a provision that the Constitution could not
be amended for two parliamentary cycles (up to eight years), the Embassy
brokered an eleventh-hour change whereby the first parliament would have a
certain time within which it could-but was not required to-propose a
package deal of amendments that would be subject to another referendum.1°4
The Ambassador then convinced one of the Sunni religious parties that had
been involved in the negotiations to endorse this amended text.
0 5
The result was that the Constitution was approved-barely. 0 6  Two
Sunni governorates rejected the text by at least two-thirds majorities.10 7 In a
third, the text was rejected, though not by the requisite two-thirds of the votes
cast. 08 A shift of some 83,000 votes in that governorate would have resulted
in a two-thirds rejection of the text, and hence a rejection of the draft text by
three governorates. 0 9 To put the result into perspective, a shift of 83,000
votes out of a total of eleven million cast, or 0.75% of the total, would have
caused the Constitution to fail. Voter intimidation in this governorate-
101. Rick Jervis, Iraqi Parliament Fails Again to Complete Constitution, USA TODAY ONLINE,
Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-08-22-iraqx.htm.
102. TAL, art. 61, para. C.
103. See Steven C. Welsh, Iraq Constitutional Referendum, CTR. DEF. INFO., Oct. 17, 2005,
http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iraq-referendum- 101705.cfin ("Fears of Sunni 'no' votes prompted a
flurry of activity in the time leading up to the referendum.").
104. See id. (stating that there were last-minute amendments made and that one amendment was
to change provisions in the draft permanent constitution that required "at least two parliamentary
cycles before being amended").
105. See MORROW, supra note 7, at 5 (reporting that Ambassador Khalilzad brokered the
agreement on October 12th between the Iraqi Islamic Party, composed mostly of Sunni Arabs, and
Shi'a leaders); see also ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 416 ("The Islamic Party was mollified by these
changes, and recommended to its supporters to vote in the affirmative on the constitution.").
106. See Edward Wong, Iraqi Officials Declare Charter Has Been Passed, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2005, at Al.
107. See Iraq Draft Constitution Approved, Officials Say: Results from Oct. 15 Referendum
Indicate 78.59 Percent Backed Charter, MSNBC, Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
9803257/ [hereinafter Iraq Draft Constitution] ("Only two other mostly Sunni provinces-
Salahuddin and Anbar-had voted no by two-thirds or more.").
108. See id ("The election commission said the predominantly Sunni province of Ninevah had
produced a 'no' vote of 55 percent.").
109. See Kanan Makiya, Present at the Disintegration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at C13
("[l]f a mere 83,283 people in the province of Ninevah had voted no instead of yes, the draft
constitution would have been defeated."). Nineveh Governorate produced a 55% no vote, rather
than two-thirds. Iraq Draft Constitution, supra note 107.
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especially by Kurdish militias-without a doubt contributed to suppressing
the no vote. Needless to say, the promised constitutional reforms have yet to
be acted upon by the Chamber of Deputies, more than three years after the
"agreement" to do so was brokered by the U.S. Ambassador.
But the problems predated the 2005 process itself. Once Bremer arrived
on the scene in May 2003, very little of what was to unfold over the next five
years seemed meaningfully related to the needs of Iraq and Iraqis. Instead,
the electoral needs of U.S. politicians seemed to drive the process-and,
unfortunately, the United States is never more than two years away from
elections. The November 15th, 2003 Agreement and its transfer of authority
to an Iraqi government by July 2004 could not help but raise the suspicion
that the Bush Administration wished to claim-as indeed it did-that politi-
cal progress was being made in Iraq in advance of its bid for reelection.
Later, virtually the entire political class in Iraq was convinced of the need to
delay elections until the security situation improved and Sunni groups could
be convinced to reenter the process. By the time elections were held, the se-
curity situation in Baghdad, as well as other provinces, was dismal, and
armed militias were roaming the streets.' 1° Indeed, the situation was so bad
that United Nations elections officials "monitored" the Iraqi elections from
Amman, Jordan, without a single elections worker in Iraq."' (From this van-
tage point, the United Nations solemnly declared the elections reasonably
free and fair.)" 12 It was not the facts on the ground in Iraq that dictated that
the elections should go forward; rather, it was a seemingly Messianic belief
by the White House in the redemptive power of elections-evidence from
around the world to the contrary notwithstanding-that prevailed.
Similarly, during the negotiations for the permanent Constitution, it was
U.S. pressure that drove the process forward. 13 It cannot be gainsaid that
pressure was applied in 2005, once again so that the U.S. Administration
could claim-yet again as it in fact did-"victory" in democracy's march
forward during the 2006 midterm elections. That the forward march of the
political process was contributing directly to the downward spiral of violence
seems to have mattered not a whit to U.S. policy makers, nor their Iraqi
counterparts for that matter. The drafters continued their work behind the
110. See Douglas Jehl, 2 C.I.A. Reports Offer Warnings on Iraq"s Path, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2004, at AI (detailing reports of violence on the streets of Iraq in the days leading up to the January
2005 Iraqi elections).
111. Hassan M. Fattah, Foreign Observers, Watching from Safe Distance, Approve, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2005, at A9.
112. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of
Resolution 1546 (2004), 5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/141 (Mar. 5,
2005) ("The conduct of the elections met recognized standards in terms of organization, regulations
and procedures. The number of serious irregularities and complaints conveyed to the Independent
Electoral Commission was relatively small.").
113. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text; see also COCKBURN, supra note 77, at 195
("The US wanted a constitution to be rushed through because this would show that there was
political progress in Iraq.").
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blast walls protecting the Green Zone even as multiple car bombs, death, and
misery were increasingly the norm for ordinary citizens throughout the
capital. 114  It is unlikely that it was mere accident that the immediate
proximate cause of the ethnoconfessional violence that engulfed the country
in 2006 and 2007-the destruction of the al-cAskariyyah Shrine in Samarrah
in February 2006-occurred four months after the referendum on the perma-
nent Constitution and two months after elections under the Constitution.
15
Such meddling was not limited, however, to the Republican
Administration. The current U.S. Vice President, when he was running for
the presidency, cowrote an op-ed with Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign
Relations calling for what Biden characterized later as the "soft partition" of
Iraq on the Bosnian model.' 16 One supposed defender of the Biden plan said
that the plan might not be "[c]ockamamie," hardly a ringing endorsement. 11
7
It seems almost beyond doubt that the phrase "soft partition" directly
contributed to the insurgency in Iraq, many of whose elements believed that
partition was the U.S. mission there in the first place.' 
18
The Biden-Gelb idea was premised on two fundamental mistakes. The
first mistake was that Bosnia was a model for Iraq. The flaw in this view-
aside from its suffering from intellectual laziness-was that it denuded Iraq
of its own history. The second mistake was that Iraqis wanted to divide
themselves into ethnosectarian enclaves. The refutation of that premise
occurred in January 2009.119 An attempt to hold a referendum on creating a
federal region in Basra, supported by much of the local power elites in that
114. See ALLAWI, supra note 5, at 372 ("[The Green Zone] turned into an enclave where the
culture of small-town America combined with the trappings of vice-regal administration. This
created a curious 'bubble' environment, divorced from the travails and life-threatening risks in the
rest of the country, with ever more dense concentrations of ... politicians."); Stanley Reed, Iraq:
The Deadly Cost of Excluding the Sunnis, BUS. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, at 51 ("In Baghdad's highly
fortified Green Zone, committees drawn from Iraq's major political parties and ethnic groups are
trying to hammer out a constitution.").
115. Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraq: Parties Call for Calm After Golden Mosque Bombing, RADIO
FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1066084.html.
116. Joseph R. Biden & Leslie H. Gelb, Editorial, Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A19; see also Helene Cooper, A Plan to Heal Iraq by Splitting It Apart,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 31, 2007, at 2 (describing Biden and Gelb's "soft partition" plan, which
called for "dividing Iraq into three semi-autonomous regions, held together by a central
government"). The plan may have "gained momentum" in Washington, but, as discussed below, it
seems to have fizzled in Iraq. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
117. Posting of Kyle Crichton to Baghdad Bureau Blog, http://baghdadbureau.blogs.
nytimes.com/2008/l 0/17/cockamamie-maybe-not/ (Oct. 17, 2008, 17:18 EST).
118. See Ned Parker & Raheem Salman, A Divided Iraq Unites Against Partition Plan, SAN
JOSE MERCURY-NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/
10/01/4226 (explaining that some Iraqis believe the U.S. partition plan was intended to set off a
sectarian war within Iraq).
119. Autonomy Referendum for Iraq's South Struck Down, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/AutonomyReferendum For IraqsSouth_
StruckDown/1372452.html.
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governorate, failed to garner the signatures of 10% of the registered voters.1 20
There will, accordingly, be no such referendum. Far from dividing the
country into ethnosectarian enclaves, it is likely that the solution to Iraq's
political crisis may well lie in asymmetrical federation. That would be an
arrangement in which the Kurds have a federal arrangement, while the rest of
the country is governed directly from Baghdad (d la Spain).
The above discussion about the U.S. role in Iraq is emblematic of the
tension inherent in the U.S.-Iraqi relationship today. On the one hand, every
Iraqi knows that but for the brave men and women of the U.S. armed
forces-and the determination of George W. Bush-a brutal tyrant would
still be ruling Iraq, a man whose record of barbarity matched that of the worst
despots who came to power worldwide in the last half of the twentieth
century. On the other hand, heavy-handedness, a deaf ear to Iraq's own
history, and an apparent indifference to exigencies as they were unfolding on
the ground all combined to condemn the country to a deteriorating cycle of
violence and destruction. It did not have to be thus.
IV. The New Iraqi Political Elites1
2 1
It was early 2004, and the representatives of the twenty-five members of
the IGC and CPA were negotiating who would control the revenues resulting
from Iraq's sale of oil during the interim period until a permanent constitu-
tion came into effect. The negotiators were each highly placed within their
respective organizations, consisting mostly of deputies to the principals who
were IGC members. Adil Abdul Mahdi, currently the Vice President of Iraq
and then (as now) deputy to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, represented the
SCIRI/SIIC. Roge Shwais, who would become Vice President of Iraq in the
first post-Saddam government and who was then Speaker of the Kurdistan
Regional Parliament, represented his principal, Masoud Barzani, the head of
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Though this author was not the dep-
uty to Adnan Pachachi, head of the Iraqi Independent Democrats and the
chairman of the interim-constitution-drafting committee, he was his senior
advisor for constitutional affairs and legal reform, served on the steering
committee of his political party, and had the portfolio for drafting the interim
constitution exclusively within the party (obviously under Pachachi's
supervision). Notwithstanding the high level of representation, this working
group was unable to come to any compromise on the issue. Bremer's deputy,
Ambassador Dick Jones, suggested that the question be bracketed and
resolved at the level of principals.
Accordingly, a meeting of the full IGC was convened to resolve the
issue. In parallel with the debate as it occurred in the deputies' committee,
120. Id
121. The authority for many of the factual statements in this Part comes from the author's
personal knowledge, gained through his experiences in Iraq during the constitution-drafting process.
To the author's knowledge, descriptions of many of these events have not been published before.
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the two camps boiled down to whether the allocation of the income from oil
sales would be a prerogative exclusively of the Baghdad government or
whether regional governments would have some right of joint ownership of
those resources. The issue was particularly sensitive for those members who
believed in a stronger role for regional governments and feared that the
Baghdad government could strangle the regions if its hands alone were on
the purse strings. The failure of the previous regime to allocate a sufficient
budget for development outside Baghdad, and outside Saddam Hussein's
home governorate, was frequently cited. The Nationalists (including this
author) feared too great a weakening of the new federal structures. The de-
bate went nowhere for hours. Jalal Talabani, currently the President of the
Republic, and then (as now) the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), asked to be recognized. In evident frustration, he pled his case again
and concluded:
If I knew that the result of all our efforts was going to be a genuinely
democratic Iraq, I would place my life in your hands. But I do not
know what the end product is going to be, and so I need assurances
that I will not be strangled as I was by the previous regime.
122
This vignette appears deeply revelatory of a central fact about the new
political elites governing the country. They fundamentally do not trust each
other. Talabani's words are not mere metaphor: "strangulation" might well
be taken quite literally. In such an atmosphere, every decision has possible
life-and-death consequences. Talabani's experience told him as much.
During the years when the United States protected the northern safe haven in
Iraq, he and Barzani decided to hold elections for a Kurdistan regional
parliament. Their inability to decide how to allocate the seats-and thus
their relative power-after the elections had resulted in the eruption of a frat-
ricidal civil war between the two parties. Before the United States brokered
a cease-fire, Barzani allied himself with Saddam Hussein, who, responding to
Barzani's appeal, sent in tanks and troops to confront Talabani. 123 Talabani
was himself a consummate practitioner of Realpolitik.124 When it became
obvious in 1991 that the United States intended to allow Saddam Hussein to
survive the Gulf War, he immediately traveled to Baghdad and was shown
122. Talabani used an Arabic colloquial expression in the Baghdad dialect ("asallimilkum
ris!"), which literally translated is "I would submit my head to you," meaning that the speaker
would do so with the certain knowledge that it would not be chopped off by his interlocutors. It is
akin to saying that he would trust his interlocutors with his life. The author was present in the IGC
Chamber when Talabani made this intervention.
123. Profile: MassoudBarzani, BBC NEWS, Nov. 26, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
l/hi/world/middle east/2480149.stm. The Clinton Administration, no doubt determined to deter
Saddam from future such misconduct and to teach him a lesson, fired off a couple of missiles,
hitting Iraqi Government positions in Basra, 350 miles away. Barzani Gambles on Iraqi Sincerity,
AUST., Sept. 13, 1996, at 7.
124. See ANDREW COCKBURN & PATRICK COCKBURN, SADDAM HUSSEIN: AN AMERICAN
OBSESSION 235 (2002) (characterizing Talabani as a mercurial "gambler in Kurdish politics" who
"switched alliances with bewildering speed, even by local standards").
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shaking hands with the despot who had butchered untold tens of thousands of
Iraqi Kurds between 1987 and 1988.125
The Kurdish Civil War was a lesson not lost on Iraq's new political
leadership. Every decision was fraught with danger, even deciding to hold
elections. After all, the losing candidate-or perhaps the winning, but mili-
tarily weaker, candidate---could not be assured of living to see the next
sunrise after the election results. The mistrust amongst the political class was
(and largely still is) at this basic level. Colleagues might mutually pledge
"their sacred honor," but few believed that the next fellow's honor was alto-
gether that sacred.
Equally fundamental, the parties did not share a mutual vision for how
the new Iraq should be restructured. Most understood that the days of a
strongly centralized Iraq were over, certainly with respect to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Given the genocide perpetrated by the previous regime against Iraq's Kurds,
no Kurdish leader would accept the constitutional status quo ante. Most also
understood that a majority of rank and file Kurds in northern Iraq would pre-
fer independence if it were an option. The Kurdish leadership, not only
Barzani and Talabani but their lieutenants as well, understood that fate had
dealt the Kurds an unfortunate and unfair hand: even if their fellow Iraqis
would agree amicably to a declaration of Kurdish independence, hostile re-
gional powers would not. Turkey, Iran, and Syria-each with substantial
Kurdish populations of their own-would not happily embrace Kurdish
independence. Each, but especially Turkey, would regard such a statelet as
an existential threat and react accordingly. Moreover, even if the Kurdish
statelet managed to wrest control of the Kirkuk oil fields away from Iraq,
being a landlocked area, it would depend on the largesse of hostile,
surrounding powers for the ability to export that oil. Moreover, the Kurdish
leadership understood, in any case, that a reasonable percentage of all of
Iraq's natural wealth would be far more valuable than 100% ownership of
Kurdistan's wealth.
The Kurdish parties thus came into the constitutional process with a
very high degree of cohesion amongst themselves. 12 6 Whatever the compet-
ing political and economic ambitions between the two groups, the KDP and
PUK, might have been, they were set aside during this period. 27 Whatever
political differences existed between the two principal parties, they were
largely, though not entirely, opaque to outsiders. 128  The Kurds thus
125. Id.
126. See Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraq: Kurds Agree to Unify Administrations, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.rferI.org/content/Article/1064623.html
(announcing that the KDP and PUK agreed to joint administration of the Kurdish government and
noting that in 2004 the two groups united to jointly draft a Kurdish regional constitution).
127. See id. (noting the historic level of cooperation between the KDP and PUK in the years
2004 through 2006).
128. See Charles Recknagel, Iraq: Kurdish Factions Struggle to Achieve Unity, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1063845.html
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presented a strong and united political front throughout the constitutional
negotiations.
129
Politics and the Americans aside, the Kurds were also militarily the
strongest force on the ground within Iraq. 130 That situation was certainly true
in 2003, after Bremer's disastrous decision to dissolve Iraq's armed and se-
curity services, 3 1 and it continued well into 2007 if not into early 2008.132
Logic and history might thus have dictated that this coalescing of factors
made the negotiations then under way for a permanent constitution the per-
fect time for the Kurdish leadership to entertain compromise from a position
of strength. Instead, in the evident belief that they would enjoy this position
of superiority ad infinitum and egged on by paid foreign advisors indifferent
to the fate of Iraq as a cohesive state, the Kurds insisted on pressing their
maximal demands for autonomy, respecting which they would not
compromise. 133 Nor were they satisfied when the other parties conceded
their demands with respect to Iraqi Kurdistan and the KRG; they insisted that
this (con)federated arrangement should be normalized throughout the
country. 134  They absolutely rejected the notion of an asymmetric
federation. 131
The Iraqi Arab interlocutors during the negotiations consisted
principally of Shii religious parties, the fate of the Sunnis having been
previously described. 136  These groups represented a very wide range of
views on the question of the nature and extent of federalism. The most
extreme view-one that shared the Kurdish vision-was held by
(detailing the public presentation of a Kurdish united front in 2005, despite some continued
infighting between factions).
129. See John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation
As Political Prescription, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 670, 678, 677-78 (2007) (describing the "'near
unanimity"' of Kurdish political leaders on the issue of Kurdish autonomy and the need for Kurdish
cooperation in the new Iraqi government).
130. See Siegfried Weissner, The Kurdish Issue and Beyond: Territorial Communities Rivaling
the State, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 107, 113, 112-13 (2004) (referring to the peshmerga, the
Kurdish militias, as America's "best all[y]" in Iraq and the Kurd's strongest weapon, and noting the
highly professional and well-trained nature of the militias).
131. See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War &
Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 614-15 (2006) (detailing the dissolution of the Iraqi
military).
132. See Country Briefings: Iraq: Political Forces, ECONOMIST.COM, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/profile.cfm?folder-Profile%2DPolitical%20Forces
(noting that peshmerga forces continue to be strong, numbering approximately 25,000 troops).
133. See id (stating that the Kurds were continuing their push for autonomy, including calling
for a referendum on placing Kirkuk in Kurdish control).
134. See Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History, 40
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 79, 79-80 (2007) (describing the Kurds' desire to have Iraq be a "voluntary
federation" that would give extraordinary powers to the regions and governorates).
135. See Michael Rubner, The Much Too Promised Land, MIDDLE E. POL'Y, Fall 2008, at 139,
162 (book review) (noting that an asymmetric federation approach would weaken the influence of
"robust regional powers" like the Kurds in Iraq).
136. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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SCIRI/SIIC. Their view can best be summarized by a statement made to this
author by its deputy during the TAL negotiations. The author expressed the
view that an interim constitution should only preserve the status quo with
respect to federalism-i.e., recognize only the KRG as a federated region-
allowing a permanent constitution to deal with the issue for the rest of the
country. Adil Abdul Mahdi, speaking on behalf of SCIRI/SIIC, retorted,
"Whatever the Kurds get, the Shicah should get." Furthermore, along the
lines of Kurdistan, SCIRI/SIIC advocates a "Shicistan," a federated super-
region combining the nine predominately Shici governorates (which have,
coincidentally, something like 90% of Iraq's oil wealth). 137
The media have too often reported SCIRI/SIIC's view on federalism as
the "ShiV position," but it is not. The ShNi religious parties, much less secu-
lar Shfah, have very divergent views on the question of federalism. On the
extreme end, the Sadrist bloc comes very close to rejecting federalism
outright, at least outside the Kurdish areas of Iraq. 138  In this sense, the
Sadrists have a pan-national outlook. While there was much degeneration in
the Sadrist position with respect to this issue in 2006 to 2007, it is no acci-
dent that Muqtada al-Sadr supported both materially and rhetorically the
insurgents in 2004 in Fallujah, a predominately Sunni city. Al-Sadr's dis-
course in those days was pan-Iraqist.
The DaCwah Party of the current Prime Minister and his immediate
predecessor, who was in office at the time of the constitutional negotiations
in 2005, took-and takes-an intermediate position. With respect to Iraq
other than Iraqi Kurdistan, it was willing to accommodate a federalist
arrangement. 139 It rejected, however, the notion of "Shfiistan, ' ' preferring
instead smaller federated regions consisting of one, two, or three
governorates. 140  Moreover, Dacwah favored-and favors-a stronger
Baghdad government than the current Constitution allows. 41 Another ShC
religious party, the Fadhilah Party, also generally followed this line of
thinking.
142
The above four ShiC religious parties, along with a group of
independents, constituted the so-called United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the
grand Shii coalition that controlled more than 50% of the seats in the
137. ANTHONY CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, UNDERSTANDING THE
FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN IRAQ BETWEEN SADR AND THE IRAQI FORCES (2008),
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080327_schiefferiraq.pdf.
138. Kirk H. Sowell, Federalism Delayed amid Sunni, Sadrist Opposition, THREATS WATCH,
Sept. 19, 2006, http://inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/09/federalism-delayed-amid-sunni/.
139. Id.
140. See id. (noting that the proposal to create a large Shiistan-type region is part of the larger
federalism debate and constitutes one of the most divisive issues of that debate).
141. See Anthony Shadid, The Political Dance in Iraq's South, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2009, at
Al (noting that the Dacwah party has resisted calls for federalism and opposed any move to take
power from Baghdad).
142. Sowell, supra note 138.
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National Assembly, which proffered the Constitution of 2006.143 How, then,
could SCIRI/SIIC's view predominate and prevail if it represented only
one-and a minority view at that-within the UIA? Even adding
SCIRI/SIIC's numbers to those of the Kurdish Alliance would not yield a
majority. Again, how did this view come to predominate?
The answer lies in the worst kind of identity politics as practiced both
by the Americans and the Iraqi leadership in the days leading up to the elec-
tions and thereafter. The CPA was so heavily focused on issues of
ethnoconfessional identity that it failed to contemplate the existence of other
identities in Iraq. It failed to contemplate, for instance, political identity:
there had been a history of Iraqi nationalists who identified with a secular-
liberal Iraq that had dominated Iraq throughout the twentieth century. 144 The
first Iraqi prime minister after the fall of the previous regime, Ayad
Allawi, 145 a man from a prominent Shii family, was an exemplar of this
political philosophy. 146 When the U.S. Ambassador undertook to "broaden
the base" of the representatives in the drafting process in 2005, he did not
support this group, even though it had garnered some 14% of the overall
vote. 147 Instead, he thought purely in terms of ethnoconfessional identity and
went in search of "Sunni representatives." The liberal-nationalists thus re-
mained essentially locked out of the constitutional negotiations.
Capitalizing on this state of affairs, the Grand Ayatullah al-Sistdni
formed the UIA with the clear intention of ensuring that a Shici religious
sensibility dominated the proceedings. He had a sense that this was his one
chance to ensure that a liberal, secular vision of the country would be
smothered, reversing the philosophical basis of the TAL. He feared that the
opportunity might not arise again. He thus insisted upon the cohesion of the
UIA, which he was able to deliver through sheer force of his personality and
influence (the latter having waned politically in the intervening years).
Whether he shared SCIRIISIIC's vision cannot be known. But his insistence
that the Shii religious parties hold together at least emboldened SCIRI!SIIC,
which successfully cowed the other parties in the UIA to adopt its position.
Once the nonelected Sunni members of the drafting committee were thrown
143. Id
144. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and
the Origin of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 270 (2008) (mentioning the existence of
multiple secular nationalistic factions).
145. In the interest of full disclosure, the author notes that he belongs to the coalition headed by
Dr. Ayad Allawi.
146. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process and
State Authority in Post-invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 529 (2007)
(describing Ayad Allawi's alliance as "secular, nationalist, [and] nonsectarian").
147. MARC J. O'REILLY, UNEXCEPTIONAL: AMERICA'S EMPIRE IN THE PERSIAN GULF,
1941-2007, at 221 (2008).
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out, those left thus adopted the extreme view of federalism reflected in the
final draft. 1
48
The leadership of the various parties thereafter did what leaderships do:
it delivered its constituents, leading the electorate into voting in the
affirmative in the referendum. In fact, there was very little discussion of the
substance of what the draft text contained and little reason to have confi-
dence that many in the electorate knew what they were voting for. As the
negotiations continued in the lead-up to the vote, the text changed within the
last two or three days before the referendum. It was not clear whether the
last published text reflected the current draft as of the day Iraqis went to the
polls. Even after the vote was held and the result was announced, it was not
certain that the draft that had just been approved had been published
verbatim. What was certain was that the very last draft had not been widely
circulated, much less widely debated. In no way was the vote in the
referendum, outside Iraqi Kurdistan, an informed one.
Once the Constitution was set and new elections held, a very different
set of considerations evinced themselves. The UIA initially seemed to hold
together, but fissures soon appeared. 149 For instance, two candidates initially
emerged in early 2006 for the premiership, Ibrahim Jaafari, the transitional
Prime Minister, and SCIRI/SIIC's Adel Abdul Mahdi. 5 ° Abdul Mahdi lost
to Jaafari by a single vote when the Sadrists within the UIA voted for
Jaafari. 151 The reason for the Sadrists' backing of Jaafari might have had
very little to do with the relative merits of the two men. Instead, they were
likely motivated by Jaafari's less radical view of federalism (in common with
the Sadrists) as well as dynastic competition between the al-Sadr and
SCIRI/SIIC's al-Hakim dynasties, two families with generations of compet-
ing religious scholars. Later, when it became clear Jaafari did not enjoy the
support of other, significant parliamentary blocs, he was replaced by the
current incumbent, Nuri al-Maliki.1
52
148. See Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, The International Migration of Constitutional
Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in
Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 899-900 (2006) (stating that the Shifah and Kurds
finished drafting the Iraqi Constitution in ad hoc gatherings and worked out key issues, such as
federalism, without the Sunnfs, and that the final document adopted the Shi'ah's federalist
demands).
149. See Kristina Arvanitis, Lessons from Iraq: Electoral Legitimacy in the Shadow of
Ethnoreligious Conflict, 20 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 529, 545-46 & n. 121 (2006) (observing that,
despite the "united" moniker, several of the parties that make up the UIA have been accused of
infighting and many groups left the UIA before permanent elections were held).
150. See Robert F. Worth, Shiite Alliance Votes to Retain Iraq's Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2006, at Al (reporting that Jaafari won the election by a single vote because followers of Moktada
al-Sadr within parliament decided to vote for him).
151. Id.
152. See Sami Moubayed, Iraq "s Next Premier: Spot the Difference, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Apr.
25, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/MiddleEast/HD25AkO1.html (noting that al-Maliki
replaced Jaafari after Shicah, Sunnis, and Kurds all called for Jaafari to step down).
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Political competition-and armed combat-between the parties over the
next two years led to the dissolution of the UIA, certainly as it existed in
2005.151 Whilst al-Sadr withdrew his support of Maliki, SCIRIISIIC changed
its colors, providing the support necessary for Maliki's government to avoid
falling in a no-confidence motion. 154 Ironically, while the UIA has been fal-
ling apart, the Kurdish Alliance, with the Marxist past of much of its old-line
leadership, has remained faithful to the "strategic alliance" it announced in
2004 with SCIRIISIIC, which seeks to introduce elements of religious law
into Iraqi civil law. 155 Politics has made strange bedfellows, indeed.
But the point is that, if the permanent Constitution were being
negotiated today, it almost certainly would be a very different document.
Whilst many of the provisions protecting Kurdish autonomy might remain
intact, there is little doubt that there would be a much more robust federal
government. In 2005, when no real governance occurred and when the con-
stitutional negotiations were more or less the only-at the very least the
main-activity taking place in Baghdad, natural fissures within alliances did
not form, and natural alliances across disparate parties could not form. The
result was a constitutional process that resulted in a text likely rejected by the
majority of the non-Kurdish political class and almost certainly rejected by
the majority of Iraq's non-Kurdish citizens.
The lesson, it would seem, is this: after the trauma of thirty-five years of
barbaric rule by the previous regime, and particularly in light of the distrust
and suspicion with which many amongst Iraq's political elite viewed one
another, the process of constitution drafting should have been delayed, not
rushed. Moreover, the timetable played out based upon the demands and
needs of a foreign power, not those of the country itself. Drafting a constitu-
tion under the circumstances that existed in Iraq resulted in a highly
controversial text and at the very least greatly exacerbated-and likely
caused much of-the violence in Iraq. As the political and constitutional
processes moved forward-and aside from al-Qacidah suicide bombings-
the Iraqi insurgency greatly intensified, reaching catastrophic levels in the
aftermath of the approval of the permanent Constitution. 156 Strengthening
the regions at the expense of a Baghdad government perceived as too weak to
hold the country together played into the worst fears of many Iraqis who
153. See Ned Parker, Radical Shiite Cleric's Bloc Quits Iraqi Ruling Coalition, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2007, at A3 (describing the UIA's drop to eighty-three seats since the election).
154. See id. ("Maliki's decision last month to form a coalition of the Islamic Dawa Party,
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Kurdistan parliament alliance may have pushed the Sadr
camp to abandon the United Iraqi Alliance.").
155. See BRENDAN O'LEARY, MEMORANDUM: WORK FOR NOT AGAINST IRAQ'S
CONSTITUTION 6-8 (2007) (arguing that the 2004 interim constitution and 2005 constitutional
conventions led to the alliance between Kurdistan's parties and the Shia Arab coalition); Parker,
supra note 153 (demonstrating that the Kurds are still part of the coalition).
156. See GILBERT BURNHAM ET AL., THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR IN IRAQ 5-8 (2006)
(indicating that both the overall death rate and the death rate due to noncoalition violence increased
sharply in the June 2005 to June 2006 timeframe).
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were always suspicious of the American enterprise. Many suspected that
dividing Iraq was the goal of the neoconservatives in the first place, 157 and
any constitution would have fed directly into such suspicions (whether ra-
tionally or not is immaterial).
Iraq's new political elites were simply not yet ready to draft a
permanent constitution. It had taken months just to negotiate an interim
constitution-as it turned out it took some four months to negotiate the
TAL-but there would be less than six weeks to hammer out the radically
different and far more controversial permanent constitution. The new politi-
cal elites needed what in labor law is called a "cooling off period," or what in
UN jargon is called time for "confidence-building measures." Assuming ini-
tial elections had been held when they actually were, the immediate task of
the first elected government should have been to restore Iraq's shattered
economy and infrastructure. Equally important, it should have set about the
task of national reconciliation in a serious way, not the halfhearted,
haphazard, ineffectual gestures that have been made. Undertaking these acts
might have contributed to a consolidation with respect to the security
situation, isolating those insurgent groups with more of a nationalist agenda
and with which it might have been possible to negotiate with al-Qacidah and
Bacthist die-hards with whom no negotiations were ever possible.
It should be recalled in this context that one of the reasons for the Sunn
boycott was the objection of some that elections were occurring in the
country whilst foreign troops were still on the ground. The presence of U.S.
forces was unavoidable given Bremer's actions in the early days of the occu-
pation in dissolving Iraq's own armed and security forces.158 Yet it almost
certainly would have ameliorated the objections of at least some Sunni
groups had the January 2005 elections not been for an assembly that would
draft a permanent constitution with foreign troops in the country. As stated
above, the elected assembly could have gone about the task of rebuilding the
country and improving people's lives without making final determinations
about the permanent future of the country.
Delaying the constitution-drafting process and focusing instead on the
more urgent needs of the country could have resulted sooner in a process that
may now be nascent. Crosscutting issues transcending ethnic or confessional
affiliations might have emerged, issues that might have fostered a meaningful
modus vivendi between the political actors. A recent vote in parliament re-
lating to an interpretation of federalist powers, for instance, saw the
emergence of a centrist alliance that cut across party affiliation as well as
across ethnoconfessional divides. Such events cannot but help to foster
157. See, e.g., Amit R. Paley & Saad Sarhan, Sadr Holds Out Against Plan to Divide Iraq,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2006, at A 18 (describing distrust and criticism by Muqtada al-Sadr of a
perceived U.S. plan to divide Iraq).
158. COALITION PROVISIONAL [A]uTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2 (2003), http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20030823-CPAORD-2 Dissolution-of EntitieswithAnnexA.pdf.
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greater trust between the various actors, trust that would seem to be indispen-
sable in constitutional deliberations.
Of course it remains possible that, as the process of governance
continues, and as greater consensus arises than has hitherto occurred, a
consensus about constitutional amendments could also arise. The problem
with such a utopian hope is the hard realities of what has transpired on the
ground over the past four years. Supposing that SCIRI/SIIC and the Kurdish
leadership awoke tomorrow to finally realize the economic absurdity of set-
ting potentially different management criteria of Iraq's oil reserves based
upon whether a field is classified as "present," 159 there would still be huge
barriers to being able to amend the 2006 Constitution. These parties have
made such an important public issue of this and other provisions as to invest
them with great symbolic significance. For them to agree to an amendment
would thus encompass no small loss of face, a condition anathema to politi-
cians throughout the world. Solving the problems now thus becomes far
more difficult, even were there a will to do it, than before positions had be-
come so publicly ossified.
The above-stated conclusions about Iraq's abortive constitutional
process can be stated more generally. A statement of this particular lesson
learnt might be that before one engages in the process of drafting a perma-
nent constitution in a country attempting the arduous task of making the
transition from dictatorship to democracy, that country's politics should be
allowed to settle into a state of some natural equilibrium. This equilibrium
allows the new political elites to factor in long-term interests as well as the
short-term goals that otherwise tend to dominate in immediate constitution
drafting. Under the best of circumstances, the drafting of a constitution can
be a divisive process, one which can tear a country asunder. That is particu-
larly true where the new elites have not yet acclimated and acculturated
themselves to the realities of shifting from an oppositional mode to one of
governance. 
1 60
Though these conclusions about Iraq can be stated in general terms,
there is no intent to suggest that the conclusions are universal. Professor
David Williams, a colleague at the Indiana University Maurer School of
Law, makes a compelling case that the above-stated observations are inappli-
cable in Burma. 161  He states that it is not too early for the Burmese
opposition to begin to think about a constitutional document, even before
159. See DISTtR art. 112, § 1 ("The federal government, with the producing govemorates and
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present
fields.").
160. Of the twenty-five members of the IGC, only three had any real governance experience:
Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani had run their respective enclaves in Iraqi Kurdistan, while
Adnan Pachachi had served as Iraq's Foreign Minister and also as an advisor to the President of the
United Arab Emirates.
161. David C. Williams, Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma's Struggle to Build a
New Order, 87 TExAS L. REV. 1657 (2009).
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they begin to govern. 62 It would be presumptuous for this author to opine
about Burma, a country he does not know. But then, were he forced to make
a universally applicable claim about the timing of constitution writing, the
only proposition asserted would likely be that the situation in each country
must be evaluated on its own merits. There is a class of countries where the
opposition was unable to set aside parochialism in favor of considerations of
a larger good and has failed to engender mutual trust and a spirit of genuine
cooperation. For that class of countries, of which Iraq was unfortunately one,
waiting to engender these institutions is a sine qua non to writing a perma-
nent constitution.
V. Conclusion
Iraq's new political elites were not ready to make the compromises
necessary to draft what might truly have been a national charter. The proof
of this fact was the impasse reached in August 2005, which subsequently re-
sulted in an overwhelmingly negative vote of Iraq's second largest
ethnoconfessional group, Arab Sunnis. 16 3 They nearly succeeded in defeat-
ing the referendum.' 64 The insistence that the process proceed apace to a
successful resolution was motivated principally by the interference of a for-
eign power indifferent to local needs and motivated only by its own domestic
political agenda. The result was calamitous ethnoconfessional violence, re-
sulting in untold numbers of dead and the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad while
U.S. forces looked on impotently-or worse, indifferently.
At least two factors interacted in a negative synergy that led to these
tragic consequences. The first factor was the insistence of the United States,
beyond any reason, that the process be completed on a time schedule meas-
ured in weeks, rather than months. At key junctures, when the Iraqi
participants wanted additional time, the United States intervened to insist
upon a shortened timetable. The second factor was a basic distrust amongst
Iraq's nascent political elites that, coupled with the shortened time
constraints, contributed to a constitutional process that disunited the new
elites and caused many to feel disenfranchised. The result, again, was vio-
lence from which it is not entirely clear Iraq will recover to preserve national
cohesion.
A far wiser course for the cadre of state builders who descended upon
Iraq would have been not to insist on adhering to an artificial deadline.
Instead, they should have taken their cue from their Iraqi interlocutors and
slowed the process down. It is obviously speculative whether doing so
would have decreased the violence. This much, however, is certain: allowing
162. Id.
163. See Iraq Draft Constitution, supra note 107 (chronicling Sunni opposition to the
referendum).
164. Id.
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Iraq's political elites to develop a modus vivendi until a certain level of trust
set in between them would most certainly not have contributed to the vio-
lence then occurring, and it might have actually avoided some of the violence
that did occur.
Undoubtedly some countries may be able to engage in constitution
writing at an early stage in their transition to democracy. Still, the state-
building community risks engendering real harm when it insists that states
that are not ready to incur the trauma of constitution writing do so. No doubt
many in this community are motivated by a genuine desire to build constitu-
tional democracy. It is naive in the extreme, however, to believe that
constitutionalism can be engendered by the mere drafting of a document in a
country where the political institutions necessary for constitutionalism are
lacking. In fragile states attempting to heal themselves after despotic rule,
the worst of all possible worlds may occur: the drafting process might cause
breaches resulting in violence in an environment that is, in any case, incapa-
ble of supporting genuine constitutionalism and the rule of law. In such
circumstances, the process-and the violence it engenders-risks becoming
utterly pointless, no more than a thing-in-itself. Indeed, as in Iraq, an early
constitutional process risks making real constitutional compromise for long-
term stability nearly impossible to achieve.
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